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ABSTRACT
As the exchange rate, foreign demand, production costs and export promotion policies
evolve, manufacturing firms are continually faced with two issues: Whether to be an exporter,
and if so, how much to export. We develop a dynamic structural model of export supply that
characterizes these two decisions and estimate the model using plant-level panel data on
Colombian chemical producers. The model embodies uncertainty, plant-level heterogeneity in
export profits, and sunk entry costs for plants breaking into foreign markets. Our estimates, and
the simulation exercises that they support, yield several implications. First, entry costs are
typically large, but vary greatly across producers. Second, there is substantial cross-plant
heterogeneity in gross expected export profit streams. Third, these large entry costs make
expectations about future exporting conditions important for many producers, so changes in the
exchange rate regime that are credible induce much more entry than those that are not.  Fourth,
however, most of the entry and exit takes place among marginal exporters who contribute little to
aggregate export revenues.  Finally, subsidies on export earnings have a much larger impact on
export revenues (per dollar spent) than subsidies that reduce the entry costs faced by new
exporters.
Sanghamitra Das Mark J. Roberts James R. Tybout
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dasm@isid.isid.ac.in1  Start-up costs are the focus of the analytical literature on export hysteresis (Baldwin and Krugman, 1989;
Dixit, 1989; Krugman, 1989).
1
1. Overview
In developing countries, manufacturing sectors that respond to export stimuli are highly
prized. By making greater imports feasible, these sectors help to generate the traditional gains
from trade. They also stabilize domestic employment by venting surplus production in foreign
markets, and they may even generate efficiency gains through trade-related technology diffusion
(e.g., Westphal, 2001). But export supply responses are poorly understood.  Seemingly similar
stimuli have given rise to very different export responses in different countries and time periods,
making it difficult to know whether the next devaluation or export subsidy scheme will generate
a surge or a trickle of new exports.
Several micro explanations might account for the puzzle of export responsiveness. First, a
strong export response may require the entry of non-exporters into foreign markets. But to break
into foreign markets, firms must establish marketing channels, learn bureaucratic procedures, and
develop new packaging or product varieties. In the presence of these entry costs, expectations
about future market conditions can critically affect current behavior, and doubts about the
permanence of export promotion packages may discourage foreign market entry.
1 
Second, entry costs make firms’ export supply responses dependent upon their previous
exporting status. Firms that already export can adjust their volumes at marginal production costs,
while those that do not must bear the sunk costs of breaking in before any exports are possible.
These two margins of adjustment—volume and entry—have distinct determinants and lead to
different supply elasticities, so seemingly similar industries with different degrees of foreign
market presence may respond quite differently to exporting stimuli. 2
Finally, even within narrowly-defined industries, firms are heterogeneous in terms of their
production costs and their product characteristics. Depending upon the distribution of these
characteristics across firms, there may be many firms poised on the brink of foreign market entry,
or just a few. Thus, when these cross-plant distributions of marginal cost and foreign demand are
unobservable, widely different export responses are possible under seemingly similar conditions. 
In this paper we develop a dynamic optimizing model of export supply that captures each
of these micro phenomena, and we econometrically fit the model to plant-level panel data on
Colombian producers of industrial chemicals.  We use our estimates to simulate export responses
to a shift in the mean of the exchange rate process. In doing so we quantify the roles of sunk
costs, exporting experience and firm heterogeneity in shaping export responsiveness. We also
demonstrate a methodology that should be relevant for other applications involving firms’
decisions to diversify into new geographic or product markets.
Our estimates imply that entry costs are large and variable across plants. Further, we find
a great deal of cross-plant heterogeneity in gross exporting profits. Most producers anticipate
only very modest profits from exporting, while a handful enjoys far more favorable foreign
demand and/or marginal cost conditions.
These features of the Colombian chemical industry shape the results of our policy
simulations. First, the fact that sunk entry costs are large makes expectations about future
exporting conditions important for many plants. Thus we find that a moderate shift in the mean
of the log exchange rate process induces sustained net entry by new exporters and rising export
volumes if producers view it as a credible regime shift. On the other hand, the exact same change
in the exchange rate process induces far less entry when producers retain their old beliefs about2 Earlier studies of export market participation have focused on the null hypothesis that sunk costs don’t
matter, but have not been structural and thus have not quantified sunk costs (Roberts and Tybout, 1997a; Campa,
1998; Bernard and Jensen, 2001; Bernard and Wagner, 2001).
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the exchange rate process.  
Second,  profits for the major exporters are sufficiently large to keep them in the export
market under any reasonable policy scenario. So the foreign market entry and exit that takes
place is concentrated among small suppliers who have a relatively minor effect on export
volumes. It follows that, while expectations have a dramatic effect on the number of exporters,
their effect on the volume of exports is much more modest.  
Third, policies that promote exports through per-unit subsidies generate far larger
responses per peso spent than policies that promote exports through lump-sum transfers for new
exporters. The reasons are that (1) exporters that need a subsidy to get into export markets are
almost always marginal suppliers; (2) these same exporters face relatively high entry costs, and
(3) large incumbent exporters, who account for most of the industry’s foreign sales are unaffected
by entry subsidies, but positively affected by volume subsidies. 
Finally, because of the cross-plant heterogeneity in our data, our simulations imply
diminishing returns to sunk or fixed cost subsidies in terms of export revenues generated per
peso spent. This is because, as subsidy rates rise, entrants at the margin are increasingly less
suited to exporting and sell increasingly little abroad.
In addition to quantifying the micro phenomena behind export responses, our model of
exporting behavior  makes several methodological contributions.  First, because we use a
dynamic structural framework, we are able to estimate sunk costs in dollars rather than simply
test for their existence.
2  These costs are critical to policy evaluation but they have rarely been4
estimated because they can only be identified by their very non-linear effects on market
participation patterns.  Second, although we model producers as choosing foreign prices and
export quantities, we cast the estimating equations in terms of the variables that we actually
observe—export revenues and variable costs.  We thus sidestep the usual problem that arises
with plant-level survey data of constructing proxies for prices and quantities from poorly
measured variables. 
The remainder of the paper has four sections. Section 2 develops an dynamic empirical
model of both the plant’s discrete decision to participate in the export market and it’s continuous
decision on the level of export revenue.  Section 3 discusses econometric issues. Section 4
presents empirical results and section 5 discusses their implications for export supply response.
Finally, section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2. An Empirical Model of Exporting Decisions with Sunk Costs and Heterogeneity
Our model of export supply is based on several key assumptions. First, products are
differentiated across firms, and the foreign and domestic market for each is monopolistically
competitive. This eliminates strategic competition, but it ensures that each firm faces a
downward-sloping marginal revenue function in each market. Second, producers are
heterogeneous in terms of their marginal production costs and the foreign demand schedules they
face for their products, so export profit trajectories vary across firms. Third, future realizations on
the exchange rates, marginal costs, and foreign demand shifters are unknown, but each evolves
according to a known Markov process. Fourth, firms must pay stochastic sunk start-up costs to
initiate exports. Finally, marginal costs do not respond to output shocks. This assumption implies3 The assumption appears to be reasonable for the industry, country, and time period we will study, since
some excess capacity was present. Estimates of average variable cost functions revealed little dependence on within-
plant temporal output fluctuations.
4  Some characteristics, such as domestic market size or capital stock, do change over time but including these
as time-varying state variables requires an increase in the complexity of the model that makes it intractable.
5
that shocks that shift the domestic demand schedule do not affect the optimal level of exports, so
it allows us to focus on the export market only.
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2.1   Gross export profits and revenues
We begin by characterizing the export profit stream that firms earn once they have broken
into foreign markets.  The magnitude of this stream depends upon things that shift the marginal
cost schedule, like technology shocks and factor prices, and things that shift the foreign demand
schedule, like foreign aggregate demand and the real exchange rate. We assume that marginal
costs and foreign demand are Cobb-Douglas functions of these factors, so that gross export
profits are log-linear in the same set of arguments:
 (1) ln(it)  0zi  1 et  2t  it
Here πit is firm i’s gross operating profits in the export market during year t (i = 1, . . . n;  t =1, . .
., T),   is a vector of time-invariant, firm-specific characteristics that lead to differences in zi
marginal costs and product desirability, et is the log of the real exchange rate and t is a time trend
that captures secular trends in factor prices, technical efficiency and foreign demand that are
general to all firms.
4  Finally, vit is a stationary, serially-correlated disturbance term that captures
all idiosyncratic shocks to foreign demand and marginal production costs.
Controlling for the trend, export profits evolve over time with exogenous shocks to et and 
vit . We assume that the exchange rate follows a first-order Markov process with normally5It would be straightforward to allow for higher-order exchange rate processes in the same way that we
treat vit . However to keep the number of state variables reasonably small we do not do so.
6 Most plant- and firm-level data sets, including ours, lack information on the prices, export quantities, and
factor prices that would be necessary to identify marginal revenue and marginal cost schedules.
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distributed shocks and we collect the parameters that characterize this process in the parameter
vector Ωe. Because the profit function disturbance, vit , picks up unobserved shocks on both the
demand and the cost side, it requires a less restrictive specification. To allow for multiple sources
of shocks while keeping firms’ dynamic optimization problems tractable, we assume that  vit  can
be represented as the sum of m normally-distributed, first-order Markov processes, which we
collect in the vector  . 
5  This assumption implies that vit is normal and has xx x x it it it it
m = (,,,) '
12 
a stationary ARMA(m, m-1) representation. We collect the parameters that characterize the
distribution of  xit and vit in the vector Ωx.  
Our data set includes information on export revenues but not on export profits, so we
cannot estimate  and Ωx directly from equation (1) .
6  To surmount this Ψ=(,,) ψ ψ ψ 012
problem we assume that firms incur no adjustment costs when changing from one positive level
of exports to another. Then short-run profit maximization implies the standard mark-up
relationship between price (Pit) and marginal cost (Cit):  , where  is a PC it i it () 1
1 −=
− η ηi > 1
firm-specific export-demand elasticity.  Also, given our earlier assumption that marginal costs do
not depend upon output levels, we can multiply both sides of this relationship by output and re-
write it a simple expression linking exporting profits and exporting  revenues (Rit):
. Substituting ln( ) on the left-hand of (1) renders the dependent πη it it it it i it RQ C R =− =
−1 ηii t R
−1
variable observable up to the vector of firm-specific foreign demand elasticities,  η = { ηi }, 
i=1,2,...n., which become parameters to be estimated.7Dixit (1989), Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and Krugman (1989) develop theoretical models that characterize
export market participation decisions in the presence of sunk entry costs.  Our representation of the decision to export is a
variant of their basic framework. 
8 These are Rust’s (1988) conditional independence assumptions. They substantially simplify the numerical
solution of the firm’s dynamic optimization problem.  Note that the errors it can also be interpreted as the managers’
transitory optimization errors when choosing export quantities or prices, as well as variation in fixed and sunk costs.
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2.2 The export market participation rule
7
 Because we have used a logarithmic functional form for equation (1), gross export profits
are always positive. Nonetheless, firms may choose not to export for several reasons. First, firms
that aren’t already exporting face the sunk start-up costs of establishing distribution channels,
learning bureaucratic procedures, and adapting their products and packaging for foreign markets.
Second, exporters incur some fixed costs each period to maintain a presence in foreign markets,
including minimum freight and insurance charges, and the costs of  monitoring foreign customs
procedures and product standards.  We now characterize firms’ exporting decisions in the face of
these costs. 
Denote the fixed costs of exporting ΓF  - 1it, where ΓF is a component common to all
firms and  1it captures all variation in fixed costs across firms and time.  Also, if the i
th firm did
not export in period t-1, assume it must pay the additional start-up costs, ΓS zi + 1it - 2it , where
ΓS is a vector of coefficients on the fixed plant characteristics, zi, and  is a vector εε ε it it it = (,) 12
of firm specific shocks that is normally distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix Ω,.
Following Rust (1988), we assume that each component of  is serially uncorrelated and εit
independent of xit  and et. 
8 
 Finally, define the binary variable yit to take a value of one during  periods when the firm
exports and zero otherwise. Then, denoting the gross profit function in equation (1) by π (xit, zi,9  Equation (2) implies that firms completely lose their investment in start-up costs if they are absent from the
export market for a single year. Earlier studies suggest that these investments depreciate very quickly, and that firms
which most recently exported two years ago must pay nearly as much to re-enter foreign markets as firms that never
exported (Roberts and Tybout, 1997a). In light of these findings, and given that more general representations make
structural estimation intractable, we consider (2) to be a reasonable abstraction.
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et, t), and assuming that all sunk costs are borne in the first year of exporting, net current export
profits accruing to the i
th firm in year t may be written as:
(2) u(et, xit, zi, t, yit, yit1, εit) 
π(xit, zi, et, t)  ΓF  ε1it if yit  1 and yit1 1
π(xit, zi, et, t)  ΓF  ΓSzi  ε2it if yit  1 and yit1  0
0 if yit  0
Note that net profits depend on the firm’s export participation in the previous year,  yit-1 , because
that determines whether it must pay the sunk entry costs to export in year t.
9  Thus the return to
becoming an exporter today includes the expected value of being able to continue exporting next
period without incurring start-up costs, which in turn depends upon the perceived distribution of
future gross exporting profits (e.g., Dixit, 1989). 
We shall assume that each period, prior to making their exporting decisions, firms
observe the current period realizations on the arguments of their gross profit function (1):  zi , et ,
and  .  These variables all follow first-order Markov processes, so they provide all the xit
information available at time t on the possible future paths for gross exporting profits.
Suppressing i subscripts, at time 0 a firm that maximizes its discounted expected profit stream
over a planning horizon of H years will therefore choose the sequence of decision rules







δt u(et, xt, z, t, yt1, yt, εt, θ)}10  This model satisfies the regularity conditions required for the existence and uniqueness of the value
function:  time separability of the profit function, a Markovian  transition density for the state variables, and a discount
rate less than one.  See Rust (1995), section 2.
9
Here E0  is the expectation operator conditioned on information available at time 0, δ is a
discount factor 0 < δ < 1, and θ is the parameter vector  .  θ ε = (, , , , , ) ΨΓ Γ Ω Ω Ω FS x e
To characterize the decision rule y(), note that expression (3) is equal to the value
function that solves the Bellman equation:
 (4) Vt(et, xt, z, t, yt1, εt, θ)  max
yt{0,1}
[u(et, xt, z, t, yt1, yt, εt, θ)  δEVt(et, xt, z, t, yt, θ)],
where EVt   is the expected value of Vt+1 over the future paths of the state variables e, x, and  :
=( 5 ) EVt(et, xt, z, t, yt, θ)
  et1 xt1 εt1 Vt1(et1, xt1, z, t, yt, εt1, θ)dFex(et1, xt1,et, xt ,Ωx,Ωe)dFε(εt1Ωε).
and dFex and dFε are the conditional distribution functions for the period t+1 values of the vectors
(e, x) and  , respectively.
10 Thus the sequence of optimal decision rules satisfies:
        (6) y(et, xt, z, t, yt1, εt, θ)  argmax
yt{0,1}
[u(et, xt, z, t, yt1, yt, εt, θ)  δEVt(et, xt, z, t, yt, θ)]
Given the parameter vector  and our distributional assumptions for the exogenous state θ
variables  , equations (6) and (1) determine optimal foreign market participation (et, xit, εit)
patterns and export profits for the i
th firm. Also the relationship  converts profits to πη it i it R =
−111Firm-level data would have been preferable but these were unavailable. 
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revenues.  Hence, aggregating over firms, these three equations provide a framework for
assessing the  roles of heterogeneity, sunk costs, expectations, and history in shaping export
responsiveness at the industry level.  In the next section we discuss the econometric issues that
arise in estimating equations (1) and (6) with micro panel data.
3. Econometric Issues
We will base our estimates on annual panel data describing all manufacturing plants in
the Colombian chemical industry operating continuously over an 11 year period.
11 For each plant
and year we observe a few fixed plant characteristics (zi), total sales revenues ( ), total TRit
variable costs ( ), and export revenues (Rit ). Given Rit, we can, of course, infer each plant’s TVCit
discrete decisions concerning whether to export (yit).  Finally,  we have time-series observations
on the real peso-dollar exchange rate (et), adjusted for the relevant export subsidies (Ocampo and
Villar, 1995).   We do not observe plants’ gross export profits, output prices,  input prices,
physical quantities sold, or any direct information on the sunk and fixed costs of exporting.
Our objective is to obtain estimates of the parameter vector θ = (Ψ, ΓF, ΓS, Ωx, Ωe, Ω)
using the likelihood function for observed trajectories of the endogenous variables, (yit, Rit).  By
equations (1) and (6),  yi and Ri  depend upon  , where variables without t subscripts (, , , ) ex z iii ε
denote entire trajectories over the sample period  (t = 1, ... T). However, both the  and the xi εi
trajectories are unobserved, so to state the likelihood function in terms of our data we must take
the expectation of the joint density function for   over ( , ).  Expectations (,, ,,,) yRe xz ii i i i ε xi εi
with respect to  are straightforward to calculate because these disturbances are serially εi11
uncorrelated and independent of  . But the  trajectories are serially correlated and (,,, ) xzRe ii i xi
related to  by equation (1). Matters are further complicated by the fact  that we do not (, , ) ez R ii
see the export revenues that were available to plants in the years when they are were not
exporting. That is, is censored at zero when yit = 0 . Rit
To deal with these problems, we base the likelihood function on observed profits of






after taking expectations over  , the likelihood  function for the i
th plant becomes: εi







−−  (| ,,, )(| , ,,, ) ( | ,,, ) θη η
11 ΨΩ ΨΩ
The product of the three components of the integrand is the joint distribution for  yi , and  xi ,  Ri
a
conditioned on   and e.  (The integration over   is mT-dimensional where m is the number of zi xi
state variables in x.)  The first component of this product,  , is the conditional probability P(|) ⋅⋅
for the exporting trajectory,  , based on the decision rule (6), after taking the expectation over yi
.  The second component,  , gives the distribution for the exogenous state variables,  , εi g(|) ⋅⋅ xi
conditional on the observed export revenue stream (among other factors). Note that because   is xi
serially correlated, export revenues in each year convey information on  for all t.  The last xit
component,  , which corresponds to equation (1),  is the density for profits from foreign h(|) ⋅⋅
sales during the exporting years, given the exogenous conditioning variables.  All three
components of the integrand in equation (7) depend on the profit function parameters (Ψ,  Ωx )
and the vector of firm demand elasticities, η, but only  depends upon ΓF, ΓS, or Ωε. P(|) ⋅⋅
Given the need for several layers of numerical integration (discussed below), it is not12 For a discussion of the computational burden of dynamic discrete choice models, see Rust (1995).
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feasible to obtain estimates of all of  the parameters that appear in (7) from a one-step maximum
likelihood estimator .
12  To handle the complexity we proceed in stages.  First, we estimate those
parameters that can be identified outside the model—the vector of firm-specific foreign demand
elasticities,  , and the parameters that govern the exchange rate process, Ωe.  Next we estimate η
the profit function parameters (Ψ, Ωx) using the  conditional density  . Then hR z e ii
a
ix (| , , , ) η
−1 ΨΩ
using these parameters, we construct the plant-specific conditional density for the mT profit
shocks,  .  Finally, taking (Ψ, Ωx), η and Ωe as given, we construct the gx R ez iii
a
ix (| , ,,, ) η
−1 ΨΩ
likelihood function for observed export market participation patterns and maximize this function
over (ΓF, ΓS, Ω).  This approach limits the number of parameters we solve for in the
computationally-intensive third stage, which requires repeated multi-dimensional integration (see
equations 5 and 7).  The costs of this approach are that, first, it is less efficient than single-stage
maximum likelihood, and second, it means that the standard errors for (ΓF, ΓS, Ω) based on the
information matrix from the final stage likelihood function are asymptotically biased downward.
We deal with the latter problem by constructing bootstrap standard errors.
3.1 Estimating demand elasticities and the exchange rate process
 To estimate the vector of plant specific demand elasticities, we assume that each plant’s
demand elasticity is the same at home and abroad, making  one minus the ratio of total ηi
−1
(domestic and foreign) variable production costs (TVC) to total revenue (TR) by the mark-up
rule. Then, assuming that true variable costs are measured up to a zero-mean error by labor and13 The assumption that the elements of ωit are orthogonal to one another is innocuous. If they were not, we
could re-state the model in terms of orthogonal shocks by using a Cholesky decomposition of their covariance
matrix.
13
intermediate input costs, we estimate (ηi)
-1 as a plant-specific average of the right-hand-side of




















estimated and true elasticities will induce measurement error in profits and will be reflected in vit.
Given our identifying restriction that  is independent of   and εi  trajectories, there is et xi
no advantage to estimating the exchange rate process jointly with other parameters. Hence, at this
preliminary stage we also obtain the parameters of the exchange rate process by fitting a simple
AR(1) process to macro data on  .  et
3.2 Estimating profit function parameters
Next we obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the profit function. By earlier
assumption, the disturbance term of this function can be written as   where νit it x = '
 is an m by one vector of ones and the elements of   follow normal AR(1) ()  = 11 1 ,, ' xi
processes. We we write the latter as:
  ,          (8) xM x it it it =+ −1 ω
where  ,      and     .























































rendering of the AR(1) processes implies the parameter vector describing the evolution of the
state variables xit is Ωx = (M, Q). More substantively, assuming that each plant begins with a14Monte Carlo experiments confirm that this procedure does a good job of recovering true values for
and . Ψ Ω x
15Brooks (2000) finds that, for a given plant, the first and final year of exporting data are significantly
smaller. 
14
random draw from the steady state distribution of xit, it implies that the profit shocks vit are
distributed  . Also, for all ,   and () NQ I M 0
21 ,'[ ]  −
− k ≠ 0 [] Ev M Q I M it it k




 (e..g., Chow, 1983).  These relationships define the conditional density Ev ij it jt k [] ν − =∀ ≠ 0
, which  in turn provides a basis for estimation of the parameters hR e z ii
a
ix (| , , , ) η
−1 ΨΩ
and . Ψ Ω x
Two final complications must be dealt with. First, we apply our estimator to the
unbalanced panel of observations for which exports are positive. But firms self-select into the
export market partly on the basis of  , so we need to correct for selectivity bias. In principle we νit
could handle this problem by maximizing a likelihood function based on (7) over the entire
parameter vector θ. However, as noted earlier, this approach is computationally very burdensome.
We therefore use a variant of Heckman’s (1979) selection correction that amounts to including a
Mills ratio in (1). This variable is based on a simple reduced form probit equation that explains
each plant’s probability of exporting as a function of its strictly exogenous characteristics:
location, business type, and initial capital stock.
14
Second, firms that have just entered the export market and firms that are about to leave the
export market do not typically report a full year’s worth of export revenues.
15 We assume that
their reported values represent some fraction of the year drawn from a uniform distribution on the
(0,1] interval, and these fractions are independent across plants and time. Then we numerically
integrate them out of the likelihood function based on  . hR e z ii
a
ix (| , , , ) η
−1 ΨΩ15
Once we have obtained estimates of Ψ, Ωx, and η we can construct the conditional
distribution  that appears in (7).  First, we use equation (1) and the data to gx R ez iii
a
ix (| , ,,, ) η
−1 ΨΩ
calculate the profit shocks  for all exporting years. Then, νit it x = ' [] =− + +
− ηψ ψ ψ ii t i t Rz e t
1
02 `
collecting all of these observable realizations on νit for the i
th plant in the column vector , and ν i
a
exploiting well-known properties of the multivariate normal distribution, we obtain:
 
   = .                     (9) gx R ez gx iii
a
ix i i
a (| , ,,, ) (|) ην
− =
1 ΨΩ () N xi
a




Here  is the column vector obtained by stacking the year-specific xit’s, and representative blocks xi
of the matrices that appear in (9) are defined by:
, {} {} xx it it s
s Exx MQI M == −  +
− (' ) ( )
21
and  {} {} xv it it s
s Ex MQI M == −  +
− () () ν
21 
 . {} {} vv it it s
s EM Q I M == −  +
− ()'( ) νν 
21
Several features of the density (9) merit comment. First, although our notation does not
show it explicitly, the dimensions and composition of  and  vary across plants with their Σ xν Σ νν
export market participation patterns. Second, equation (9) uses information on a plant’s observed
exporting revenue to extrapolate to non-exporting years, given the autoregressive processes
summarized by Ωx . Finally, if the i
th plant never exports, we do not observe  in any year so the νit
distribution of  is unconditional: E( ) = 0 and  .  This is the only case in which xi xi Exx ii x x (' ) =Σ
 is full rank; otherwise the constraint      makes one component Σ xx 'xit [] =− + +
− ηψ ψ ψ ii t i t Rz e t
1
02 `
of xit  a deterministic function of the others in the exporting years.
3.3 Estimating sunk and fixed cost parameters 16 Antithetic sampling is a way to limit simulation error. It means that for each draw from the relevant density
we include its mirror image, ensuring that the set of draws used is symmetric about the true mean.  See Rubinstein (1986)
for discussion.
16
Having obtained  ,  ,  ,  and  , we estimate the Ψ Ω x η Ω e gx R z e iii
a
ix (| ,, ,, ) ⋅
− η
1 ΨΩ
remaining parameters in   by maximizing the sample likelihood function based on (7) over (ΓF, θ
ΓS, Ω).  Given our assumptions on the exogenous state variables ,  ,and  , exporting εi xi ei
decisions in year t depend only upon exporting status in year t-1 and current year information.  So,
taking expectations over  , the  probability of the participation trajectory yi may be written as a εi
product of year-to-year transition probabilities, conditioned on the other variables:
(10)









(Equation A1.2 of appendix 1 provides the expression we use to calculate these transition
probabilities.) The likelihood function we use for our final stage of estimation is thus:



















When evaluating (11), we integrate over  trajectories  numerically.  Specifically, plant by xi
plant, we sample  realizations antithetically from  , calculate the associated xi gx R z e iii
a
ix (| ,, ,, ) η
−1 ΨΩ
probabilities,  , and average them.
16  Py ex z ii i [| ,,, ] θ
Obtaining the transition probabilities themselves is more involved. To calculate them we first
evaluate   at  yit = 1 and yit = 0 using backward induction. Then we substitute EVt(et, xit, zi, t, yit, θ)17
these values into right-hand side of the decision rule (6) along with the net profit function (2), and we
take the expectation of the implied yit choice over . We repeat these calculations plant by plant for εit
each sample year, every time the likelihood function is evaluated.  Further details are provided in
appendix 1.
Each step of the backward induction involves taking expected values over (, ) ex ti t ++ 11
realizations, given  . Earlier studies have performed this type of calculation by discretizing the (, ) ex ti t
vector of state variables and calculating transition probabilities among each vector of values (Rust,
1988, Das, 1992). The problem with this approach is that it involves a large number of calculations.
For example, with 3 continuous state variables and r different values per state variable, there are r
3
points in the state space and r
6 transition probabilities involved in the calculations at each stage of
the backward induction. With a reasonably long planning horizon, approximation errors compound,
and it becomes necessary to use very large values of r.  This “curse of dimensionality” led  Rust
(1997) to develop an alternative approach. Instead of  treating all possible combinations of values for
the discretized state variables as elements of the state space, Rust generates the state space with
random draws from the joint probability distribution for the vector of state variables.  This solves the
dimensionality problem because increasing the number of state variables increases the dimension of
each point, but does not increase the number of points over which one integrates.
We adopt Rust’s (1997) approach in the present study.  First, taking our estimates of 
and  as given, we draw G points from the steady state distribution of  using antithetic Ω x Ω e (,) ex ti t
sampling. Then using  and once more, we calculate the G
2 transition probabilities for Ω x Ω e
movements between all possible pairs of these points, thereby constructing a discrete analog to 
   Together, these points and transition probabilities allow us to perform () d F exe x ti t t i t e x ++ 11 ,| , , ,. ΩΩ17  A more general framework would treat each plant as making simultaneous decisions to enter or exit
production and to enter or exit the export market.  This would require us to model the sunk costs involved in setting up a
plant.  In Colombia, most exports over the sample period came from the plants that were continuously in operation and
focusing solely on this group of plants is a reasonable starting point that substantially simplifies the empirical model.
18 The number of chemical plants remains fixed at 62 during the sample because we  have excluded
producers who enter or exit to simplify the econometrics, so there is some potential for selectivity bias.
18
the integration at each step of the backward induction algorithm for calculating EVt .
4.  An Application to the Colombian Chemicals Industry
4.1   Overview of the export patterns
Although our framework should describe any industry in which exporting is potentially
profitable for some firms, it is easiest to identify parameters in those industries which have many
exporters, and which exhibit substantial variation in the set of exporters over time.  For these
reasons, we choose to estimate our model using data on the Colombian chemicals industry for the
period 1982 through 1991, which is summarized in table 1 below.  Our data set covers 62 major
chemical producers that operated continuously during the sample period.
17 It was originally collected
by Colombia’s Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), and was cleaned as
described in Roberts and Tybout (1996).
Note that the Colombian peso depreciated substantially in real terms during the sample
period, and that chemical exports simultaneously grew.  The expansion was partly due to an increase
in the number of exporters, and partly due to increases in the magnitude of foreign sales at the typical
exporting plant.
18  Colombian chemicals plants produced 35.00 billion pesos ($236 million US)
worth of exports in 1991, of which 29.94 billion came from plants that were exporting in 1984. So
entry by new exporters contributed 5.06 out of the 27.10 expansion. Also, of the 62 plants that
existed during the entire sample period, 18 exported in all ten years, 26 never exported, and 1819 Goldberg and Knetter (1999) use data aggregated to the seven-digit industry level to estimate much
lower export demand elasticities for manufactured products. The discrepancy between their results and ours
probably traces largely to the fact that individual plants within a narrowly defined product category export close
substitutes for each others’ products. 
20An AR(2) process fits the data significantly better, but the improvement is minor (R
2 = .85 versus R
2 =
.79), and the cost of adding an additional state variable to the model is substantial. Given that the focus of the paper
is not on modeling the exchange rate process, we have chosen to keep this aspect of the model as simple as possible.
19
switched exporting status at least once. So, although there were a number of switches, the data
exhibit substantial persistence.  This could be due to serial correlation in the plant-specific state
variables, , or it could be due to sunk entry costs, or some combination of both. Our (,) xx it it
12
estimates will shed light on the relative importance of these different forces.
4.2 First Stage Estimation: Demand Elasticity and the Exchange Rate Process




















elasticity of demand. The smallest elasticity is 1.5 and the largest elasticity is constrained to be 20.
(Six plants were affected by this constraint.)  More than 80 percent of the plants fall between 1.5 and
8.5, and the median elasticity is 5.0. Thus export profits at the typical plant amount to approximately
one-fifth of export revenue.
19 
Using data for 1967-1992, we estimate a simple AR(1) process for the real effective export
exchange rate calculated by Ocampo and Villar (1995).
20  The coefficients (standard errors in
parentheses) are  = .549 (.429) +  0.883 (.094) et-1  and  = 0.0043.  The Dickey-Fuller test  et  σ
2
statistic for stationarity is -1.93 and the critical value is -2.78 at a 90 percent confidence level. So,
although our point estimates suggest the exchange rate process is stationary, the usual problem with
test power prevents us from rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root. 20
4.3 Second Stage Estimation:  Profit Function Parameters
Next we use  to impute export profits and we estimate the profit function (1). πη it i it R =
−  1
Exploratory tests using GMM estimators reject the null hypothesis that the error in the profit function
error, , follows a first-order process, but they do not reject the null that it follows an ARMA(2,1) νit
(see appendix 2).  Thus we model the profit error as the sum of two AR(1) processes and use
maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of the profit function Ψ and Ωx = {Q, M} that
describe the evolution of the profit shocks.  
The resulting parameter estimates are reported in Table 2. Recall that zi is meant to capture
time-invariant heterogeneity in operating profits. We model these using a set of three size dummies
based on domestic sales in the pre-sample year. These dummies should proxy for both product
quality and marginal production costs at the beginning of the sample period. Our estimates imply that
this type of variation in not particularly important. (Experimentation with other dummies based on
geographic location and business type yielded similar results.)  
On the other hand, the elasticity of export profits with respect to the exchange is 2.45 and
significant. Since the same elasticity describes responses of export revenues, it implies that
devaluations do more than simply revalue a fixed physical quantity of exports—volumes respond
too.  The trend term, which picks up secular growth or shrinkage in foreign markets and/or in
marginal production costs, adds little.  We caution, however, that both of these coefficients are
identified with only eleven years of data, so they may not be representative of longer time periods. 
Replacing the exchange rate and the trend term with annual time dummies did not improve the fit
significantly (results not reported), so these variables appear to do a reasonable job of controlling for21 To generate the bootstrap standard errors, we repeatedly draw random samples of 248 plants (with
replacement) from our data set of 62 plants. Each draw is an entire plant-specific trajectory for the variables that enter
our estimator. For each bootstrap sample we repeat all stages of estimation except the exchange rate process. Then we
construct the mean squared deviation of bootstrap estimates from the estimates based on our original sample of 62 plants.
We used bootstrap samples 4 times the size of the original sample because when only 62 plants are drawn we
occasionally get a sample with too few transitions in exporting status to identify all of the parameters. To correct for this
difference in sample size, we double the root  mean squared deviations (i.e., weight them by  ) before reporting them.   4
21
time effects that are common to all plants. Put differently, barring spatial correlation, our assumption
that the disturbances in equation 1 are not correlated across plants seems reasonable.  Finally, note
that the Mills ratio has the expected sign and is quite significant. This implies that exporting firms
enjoy relatively favorable realizations on  vit .
The parameters of the xit process, Ωx, are reported at the bottom of table 2. Each is identified
with plant-specific variation and thus is estimated with a good deal of precision.  Both λ1 and λ2 are
less than one in absolute value and significantly different from zero.  The variances, q1 and q2 , are
also significantly greater than zero.  Thus, as suggested by the specification tests reported in
appendix 2, it would be inappropriate to treat the profit function disturbance, vit, as a first-order
process. Our interpretation is that profit shocks arise from both demand and cost shocks, each with
its own root.
4.4 Third Stage Estimates: Sunk Costs and  Fixed Costs
Table 3  reports our estimates of  . Four Γs estimates appear in this table,  (,,) ΓΓΩ FS ε
corresponding to the four plant size quartiles we distinguish. We report two types of standard errors.
The first, reported in column 2, is based on the information matrix for the third stage likelihood
function (11), and therefore is not adjusted for the fact that the first and second stage parameters are
estimated. The second, reported in column (3), is a bootstrap estimate that recognizes the estimation
of all the parameters in the model. 
21  Although the bootstrap standard errors suggest that our third        
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stage parameter estimates are not significantly different from zero, this implication is misleading. 
Their magnitude reflects the fact that, out of the 200 bootstrap samples, several contained very few
exporting plants and thus poorly identified  .  Nonetheless, as figure 1 demonstrates, all (,,) ΓΓΩ FS ε
of the bootstrap samples yielded   parameter estimates greater than zero. Further, the bootstrap ΓS
samples that yielded large   estimates also yielded large estimates of  and  . Thus we ΓS σε1 σε2
estimate the ratios of sunk costs to the noise in the profit function for entrants with much greater









associated vector of asymptotic z-ratios is (1.39, 2.76, 2.53, 2.55). So for all size categories except
the smallest, sunk entry costs are clearly greater than zero.
Turning to the parameter estimates themselves, note first that sunk costs appear to fall with
plant sizes, suggesting that big plants with large domestic market shares are in a better position to
step into international markets. (Γs1 is the average export market entry cost among plants in the
smallest size quartile, Γs2 is the average entry cost for plants in the second quartile, and so on.)  This
pattern could reflect existing contacts and distribution channels among large firms, the types of
products large firms produced, or to the mix of people they employ.  
One advantage of  structural estimation is that it allows us to calculate the sunk costs of
entering foreign markets in currency units.  Table 3 implies that, at a discount factor of 0.9, the
expected sunk costs of breaking into export markets vary from 108 to 242 million 1986 pesos,
depending upon which plant size category we are describing. In 1999 US dollars, these figures are
$730,000 and $1.6 million, respectively. 
The fixed cost ΓF estimate is very close to zero, and as already discussed, our bootstrap23
distribution suggests that these costs are negligible on average. Recall, however, that fixed costs are 
ΓF  - , and our bootstrap distribution bounds   above zero. So fixed costs are important at least ε it
1 σ ε
1
some of the time for some of the plants. Finally, note that  is similar in magnitude and also σ ε2
bounded above zero by the bootstrap distribution, implying that sunk costs vary considerably across
plant, even after controlling for their size class.
Given that the estimation procedure involves several stages and repeated multi-dimensional
integration, we explored the sensitivity or our estimates to the fineness of the grid used for
integration over one-step-ahead realizations on exogenous state variables and  the number of
trajectories drawn per plant for  integration over xi .  Coefficient estimates varied roughly 20 percent
with grid draws and xi draws. However, this range of variation did not decline as we increased the
number of grid points and xi trajectories per plant to the maximum values feasible with our hardware.
(The maximum number of grid points, G, we used was 300 and the maximum number of xi
trajectories per plant we used was 50.)  
5. Implications for Export Supply
5.1   Profits, option values and transition probabilities 
To explore the implications of sunk costs and plant profit heterogeneity, we calculate the
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This expression has a current profit component (first line) and an option value component (second24
line), which measures the value of being able to export next period without paying entry costs. Note
that  is an expectation over the unobservable  values, so it shows less cross-plant heterogeneity ~ Vit xit
than was actually present. 
The gross expected value of exporting for the first year in our sample (t=1982) is compared
with expected sunk entry costs, , plant by plant, in figure 2. Plants are sorted by sunk cost ΓSi z
category, then by ascending  . The circled lines in the figure are the sunk costs that are
~
, Vi 1982
estimated for each of the four plant types, where the type is defined by the plant’s size in the
domestic market.  For the left-most group of plants, the ones with the smallest domestic output
levels, the sunk cost of entry (242 million pesos) exceeds the gross expected export value for all the
plants.  This is also true for the second group of plants, which faced a sunk entry cost of 136 million
pesos, but in this case both the gross expected export value and sunk cost are lower than for the first
group.  Ignoring noise in sunk costs and  realizations, no non-exporter in either group would xi,1982
find it profitable to enter the export market. For the remaining two groups of plants the profit
heterogeneity is more extreme and some plants have gross expected export values that are high
enough that they would enter the export market.  For the largest plants, expected profit heterogeneity
is substantial. Note that a single plant stands out with exceptional export profits. 
For several reasons, figure 2 should not be used to predict which plants will actually be in the
export market: it averages out noise in sunk costs and  realizations, and it provides no xi,1982
information on plants’ prior export experience.  To illustrate the difference that prior experience
makes, we construct the 1982 plant-specific transition probabilities, once again taking expectations
over  .   Figure 3 shows the probability that each plant will remain an exporter, assuming it xi,1982
exported in the previous year, and the probability that each plant will enter the export market,25
assuming it did not export in the previous year. Plants are sorted in order of ascending .  The
~
, Vi 1982
probability of remaining an exporter, once in, is above .8 for virtually all plants.  That is,
P( + > 0) is quite high for most plants.  In contrast, the probability of entering the market
~
, Vi 1982 ε 1 1982 i,
P(   + >0)  is much lower for virtually all plants, and below .1 for half of the
~
, Vi 1982 −ΓSi z ε 1 1982 i,
plants.  Only a few plants have entry probabilities that exceed .5, indicating that the sunk entry costs
are a significant entry hurdle for most producers.  
We now isolate the role of option values in determining export market participation patterns.
This component of   depends on the plants’ expectations of future market conditions and is
~
, Vi 1982
bounded by their sunk costs. To illustrate how important the option value is as a source of the plant’s
total export value, figure 4 plots current profit net of fixed costs,  , and total export value for each Γ F
of the non-exporting plants in 1982.  The difference between the two curves is the option value.  If
there were no sunk costs of entry, the option value would be zero and the two curves in figure 4
would be identical.  The figure demonstrates that the option value is a large component of the total
value of the plant.  In fact, in many cases the current profits that would be earned by being an
exporter are close to zero, so that the option value is the largest component of  .  Even among
~
, Vi 1982
firms with substantial current profits from exporting, the option value still accounts for about two-
thirds of total export value.  As expectations of future market conditions improve, the option value
term increases and can induce entry even if current profits are unaffected.
Total industry exports depend on both the number of plants exporting and the foreign sales
volume of each plant. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of export revenue for all plants in 1982,
sorted by export revenue.  The upper line, denoted by triangles, gives the cumulative export revenue
earned by the 25 plants that were actually in the export market in that year.  Total export revenues22  This is accomplished by increasing the intercept of the estimated autoregressive process for the log of the
exchange rate.  Given the parameter estimates reported in section 4.2, the steady state mean of the logarithmic exchange
rate is .549/(1-.883) = 4.69.  Using the relationships between the mean and variance of a normal and a log normal random
variable, a two percent increase in the mean of the log exchange rate translates into a 10 percent increase in the mean of
the exchange rate itself.  
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were approximately 6.3 billion pesos.  Differences in the size of the exporters are obvious, with the
largest two plants accounting for almost half of the industry revenue.  Figure 5 also illustrates the
predicted revenues that would have been earned by each of the non-exporting plants if they had been
induced to enter the market.  The cumulative predicted exports of the 37 non-exporting plants are
approximately 2.6 billion pesos.  These plants would have increased industry export revenue by
approximately 41 percent if they had been in the market, but no one of the non-exporters would have
added more than several percentage points by itself.
5.2  Simulated Effect of a Devaluation
The export supply response to a devaluation reflects adjustments on two margins: entry-exit
and output adjustments among incumbents.  To quantify each type of response we simulate firms’
reactions to a permanent change in the exchange rate process that depreciates the steady state value
of the peso by 10 percent, leaving its variance unchanged.
22  The regime shift takes place in period 1
and we track firms reactions over the following nine periods. Firms always begin period 1 in their
observed state, thereafter all realizations on x and e are simulated. We calculate expected reactions
by simulating 300 exchange rate trajectories under each scenario and averaging each firm’s
responses. 
The effect on the number of exporting plants is illustrated in the top panel of figure 6.   The
first simulation, which we label “credible devaluation,” characterizes reactions when the regime
switch is correctly anticipated and believed by all plants.  By this terminology we mean that all plants27
use the correct new regime parameters for the exchange rate process when they formulate
expectations about future profits.  Under this assumption we calculate an expected first-year increase
of 4.5 percent in the number of exporting plants.  The expected number of exporters continues to
expand by a total of 12.2 percent over the nine-year horizon we simulate.  
Figure 6 also shows expected responses to a “non-credible” regime switch in which
producers incorrectly continue to use the pre-reform exchange rate parameters in their evaluation of
future profit trajectories.  Under this scenario there is virtually no response in the expected number of
exporting plants.  Even after 5 years of experience with the more favorable exchange rate, no new
entry has occurred.  This markedly different outcome is solely due to differences in expectations,
since gross operating profits evolve in the same way under both scenarios.  Thus a substantial,
permanent change in the exchange rate process may not induce entry if firms view the outcomes as
transitory shocks generated by the old regime.  
The effect of the same devaluation on the level of export revenue is illustrated in the bottom
panel of table 6.  Here expected export revenues increase approximately 5 percent in the first year of
the new policy and approximately 37.5 percent over the nine-year horizon.  The increase in total
export revenue is driven primarily by the expansion of the existing exporters and this is insensitive to
the perceived credibility of the exchange rate change.  The difference in revenue growth between the
credible and non-credible devaluation is the result of the entry of the new exporters in the credible
regime.  While there is significant new entry, the new exporters are relatively small and so they make
only a small contribution to total export revenue.  
5.3 Alternative Policies to Subsidize Exports   23Those who advocate export promotion (e.g., Westphal, 2001) argue that exports generate various positive
spillovers, while those who are opposed to export promotion (e.g., Panagaria, 1999) discount the importance of
these spillover effects.
24 In Colombia, the most important subsidy has been a tax rebate that is proportional to foreign sales. This
rebate has been delivered in the form of  negotiable certificates (Certificado Abono Tributarios) that recipients can
use to retire their taxes or sell on a secondary market. Other export subsidies have included a duty drawback scheme
(Plan Vallejo), insurance against exchange rate risk on dollar-denominated export loans (discontinued in 1977), and
subsidized export credit (from PROEXPO). As Ocampo and Villar (1995) document, the combined value of these
subsides fluctuated between 16 and 27 percent of export sales for manufacturing overall during the sample period.
We use Ocampo and Villar’s real effective export exchange rate to estimate our model, so although we do not isolate
their effects, these subsidies are built into our analysis.  
25 Alternatively, creation of export trade groups that collect information on sources of demand and match
foreign buyers and domestic producers can also act to reduce one substantial cost of entry for new exporters.  Information
deficiencies were identified as significant impediments to exporting by Colombian manufacturers in a recent survey.  See
Roberts and Tybout (1997) for discussion.  
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The case for export promotion policies is controversial.
23 Nonetheless, it is quite common to
find significant promotional regimes in place. In this section we shall ignore the question of whether
export promotion is desirable and address the positive quantitative issue of how effective various
types of promotion are in terms of their impact on export volumes.
Aside from currency devaluation, governments in developing countries and elsewhere have
used a variety of tools to encourage manufactured exports. (Panagaria,1999, provides a critical
review.) In terms of value, the most significant ones are usually direct subsidies linked to plant’s
export revenues.
24  Preferential credit and insurance are commonly provided by official export
promotion agencies and/or administered through the financial sector. Export processing zones
provide duty-free access to imported inputs that are subject to tariffs among non-exporters.  Policies
that affect transport costs through the public development of port facilities do the same. All of these
subsidies increase the profits of plants once they are in the export market and thus tend to induce
volume adjustments among incumbent exporters, as well as net entry.
A second policy option is to directly subsidize the sunk costs that plants incur to enter export
markets.
25 Matching grant programs that subsidize information acquisition or investments in26Pursell (1999) notes that such programs have gained popularity rapidly at the World Bank during the past
decade. “The justification for these projects is generally that there are exporting firms that would increase their
exports and non-exporters that would start to export, but do not do so because they lack crucial information and
services, e.g.,  information on export markets, production techniques, packaging and delivery requirements, product
standards, etc.” (Pursell, pp. 20-21)
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technology acquisition for export development fall under this heading, presuming that these are one-
shot start-up costs.
26 Support for participation in trade fairs might also be classified as this type of
policy, given that it reduces the costs of establishing a foreign clientele. Sunk cost subsidies
encourage entry, but if they do not affect marginal production costs they should not affect export
volume decisions, given foreign market participation. Further, they also encourage exit if they are
available repeatedly to the same producer because they reduce the incentive to avoid re-entry costs
by remaining in foreign markets during unprofitable periods.
A third type of export promotion provides subsidies that are not directly tied to plants’ export
level but rather are flat payments designed to cover the annual fixed costs of operating in the export
market. The same types of policies that help to reduce entry costs can fall under this heading,
provided that regular expenditures are required to maintain foreign clients and/or adapt the product
to evolving tastes, technologies and characteristics of competing products. Unless they shift the
marginal production cost schedule, fixed costs subsidies resemble sunk cost subsidies in that they
operate on the entry-exit margin but not the volume margin. However, given that they do not affect
the threshold costs associated with exit and re-entry, their effect should be primarily on the number
of exporters rather than the long run rate of turnover among exporting plants.
Using our estimated model, we simulate each of these policy options.  First we explore the
effects of a per-unit subsidy equal to 10% of their export revenue.  Second, we simulate fixed cost
subsidies amounting to 10 million pesos and 20 million pesos.  (The average  value is 152 million ~ Vit30
pesos among the existing exporters in 1982.)  Finally, we simulate a reduction of sunk entry costs by
50 million pesos, which given our estimates of 108 to 242 million pesos, amounts to a 20 to 50%
reduction in entry costs, depending on the plant type.  In order to compare these policies, we
construct a benefit-cost ratio for each one by calculating the total gain in export revenue that would
accrue in each year and dividing it by the direct cost of the subsidy in that year.
Export revenues per unit subsidy (hereafter “benefit-cost ratios”) for the four policy options
are graphed in figure 7.  Policies that subsidize fixed or sunk costs all generate benefit-cost ratios
that are less than one, varying from .11 to .57 in the first year after the change.  In contrast, the
subsidy proportional to revenue has a benefit-cost ratio of 3.3 in the first year.  The reason for this
difference is that revenue subsidies act directly on the exports of the largest exporting plants which,
in turn, account for a substantial increase in total market revenue.  In contrast, the other three policies
all act exclusively on the entry-exit margin. All induce new exporters to enter, but because the new
entrants are very small and the policy provides no incentive for the large existing exporters to
expand, the overall impact on total market revenue is small.  For example, the policy that reduces
fixed cost by 10 million pesos generates a 14.8 percent increase in the number of exporting plants
but only a 1.8 percent increase in total export revenue.  Increasing the subsidy to 20 million pesos
generates a 34.4 percent increase in exporters and a 3.5 percent increase in revenue.  Both policies
are relatively expensive because they subsidize every exporter by the same amount, regardless of
export volume.
Over time the benefit-cost ratios change as additional entry and exit occurs.  The ratio for the
policy that reduces fixed costs by 10 million pesos trends upward over time and exceeds one after
five years.  At that point the total number of exporters has increased by 48.1 percent and total export31
revenue by 6.7 percent.  The higher subsidy of 20 million pesos also has a benefit-cost ratio that
trends upward over time as entry occurs but the ratio never exceeds .77.  The reason for this is that it
encourages the entry of many more small exporters.  The total number of exporters increases by 91.7
percent over 5 years and, while this generates a larger increase in export revenue, 10.4 percent, than
the smaller subsidy, it also generates significant subsidy costs.  The rate is so generous that many
small plants choose to enter and remain in the export market but generate so little revenue that they
do not cover the cost of the subsidy they receive.  
Sunk cost subsidies also generate a gradual increase in the number of exporting plants, 17.0
percent, and export revenue, 2.8 percent, over the nine year simulation horizon.  However, the
benefit-cost ratio for this type of policy never rises above .65.  The main reason for this is that the
sunk cost subsidy is available to each plant each time it enters, so the government repeatedly pays the
entry costs of the same group of marginally profitable exporters as they move in and out of the
market. Total turnover, the sum of the number of entering and exiting plants, doubles, from 5
plants/year before the subsidy to 10 plants/year afterward, making this a relatively inefficient way to
generate export revenue.  Finally, entry into the export market also affects the benefit-cost ratio of
the revenue subsidy policy.  In this case the ratio falls over time.  This happens because the marginal
exporters drawn into the market by subsidies have relatively low demand elasticities, and thus
generate relatively little revenue per unit of subsidy received.
6.         Summary 
In this paper we develop a dynamic structural model that characterizes firms’ decisions
concerning whether to export and the volume of foreign sales among those who do.  The model32
embodies uncertainty, plant-level heterogeneity in export profits, and sunk entry costs for plants
breaking into foreign markets. We estimate the model with plant-level panel data on sales and
production costs among Colombian chemical producers. Then we use the results to quantify sunk
entry costs and export profit heterogeneity, and we conduct dynamic policy analysis.
    Our results imply that entry costs are substantial. Consequently, producers don’t initiate
exports unless the present value of their expected future export profit stream is large. They also tend
to continue exporting when their current profits are negative, thus avoiding the costs of re-
establishing themselves in foreign markets when conditions improve. For example, we calculate that
plants exporting in year t generally remain exporters in year t+1 with probability 0.8 or greater. But if
these same plants were, for some reason, not to have exported in year t, very few would have
exported in year t+1 with probability greater than .5.  Further, for many plants the option value of
being able to export next year without paying entry costs substantially exceeds the current profits
that they expect to earn by exporting.  
Heterogeneity in plants’ marginal production costs and the foreign demand conditions they
face also affects their export sales volumes. In a typical sample year, the 5 largest exporters account
for 74 percent of total sales while most of the other 20 exporters contributed less than one percent
each. We calculate that the 37 non-exporters would have contributed even smaller shares, on
average, if they had entered. The major exporters find it profitable to maintain their foreign market
presence under any reasonable policy scenario, so almost all of the entry and exit that takes place is
concentrated among these small producers. 
The export growth induced by a pro-trade shift in the exchange rate regime depends on the
volume response among existing exporters and the number and size of foreign market entrants versus33
quitters. In our application, much of the response to a 10 percent devaluation in the expected steady
state rate comes from foreign sales growth among existing exporters.  For example, after 9 years, a
credible 10 percent devaluation in the steady state expected exchange rate results in a 12.2 percent
increase in the number of exporters and a 37.5 percent increase in export revenue.  The average
incumbent exporter is 19.3 percent larger at the end of the period and the average entrant is 6 percent
larger. These results on the number of exporters depend crucially on the credibility of the exchange
rate change and the magnitude of sunk entry costs.  When producers view the same exchange rate
realizations as generated by the pre-reform regime, the number of exporting plants increases by only
2.3 percent and the total increase in export revenue is virtually unchanged. 
Finally, the effectiveness of export promotion policies depends upon their form. Subsidies
that are proportional to plants’ export revenues generate far more foreign exchange per peso spent
than policies that reduce the sunk costs of foreign market entry. For example, a 10 percent subsidy on
export sales generates 3.3 pesos worth of foreign exchange per peso spent by the government. In
contrast, a 50 million peso reduction in sunk entry costs (which amounts to a 20 to 50 percent
reduction in entry costs, depending upon the plant) generates only 0.1 peso worth of foreign
exchange per peso spent. The relative inefficiency of market entry subsidies reflects the fact that they
act only on the entry/exit margin, and thus induce no sales responses among the dominant export
suppliers. Further, the producers who are induced to enter by entry subsidies are generally marginal
suppliers. 
  In sum, sunk entry costs and cross-plant heterogeneity in cost and foreign demand conditions
significantly affect export dynamics. We have demonstrated how to characterize these effects
empirically using plant-level panel data on a few basic variables. While the parameter estimates we34
report and the quantitative effects they imply are specific to the Colombian chemicals industry, we
believe that the forces we have documented are general, and that the methodology we exposit here
should be adaptable to other contexts involving market diversification .35
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Appendix 1: Transition Probabilities for Export Status 
The likelihood function in equation (11) requires evaluation of transition probabilities for
export status.  These in turn require us to calculate the optimal export decision in (6) and evaluation
of the expected future value EVt in (5).  Let V0t, V10t and V11t  respectively be the value from not
exporting in period  t, from beginning to export in period t after not exporting in period t-1, and from
continuing to export in period  t after exporting in period  t - 1, each exclusive of transitory noise:
(A1.1)
V11it  π(xit,zi,et,t)  ΓF  δEVt(xit,zi,et,t, yit1)
V10it  π(xit,zi,et,t)  ΓF  ΓS  δEVt(xit,zi,et,t, yit1)
V0it  δEVt(xit,zi,et,t, yit0).
We assume that the profit function errors (see equation 2), ε1 and  ε2, are independent normal random
variables so that  .










probabilities of observing the different combinations of exporting states in years t-1 and t can be
written as functions of the normal cdf:
(A1.2)
P[yt1|yt10]  P[V10tε2t > V0t]  Φ
V10tV0t
σε2
P[yt1|yt11]  P[V11tε1t > V0t]  Φ
V11tV0t
σε1
P[yt0|yt10]  1  Φ
V10tV0t
σε2
P[yt0|yt11]  1  Φ
V11tV0t
σε138
Once V0t, V10t and V11t are calculated up to the unknown parameters, maximum likelihood
estimation using equation 11 becomes straightforward.  However, these expressions are difficult to
calculate because they involve the expected value of the period t+1 value function conditioned on
period t information. We begin by writing this expectation as:
 (A1.3) EVt(et, xt, yt, θ)  ytEtmax(V11t1ε1t1,V0t1)  (1yt)Etmax(V10t1ε2t1,V0t1)
where:
   
Etmax(V11t1ε1t1,V0t1)  P[ε1t1>V0t1V11t1][V11t1  E(ε1t1|ε1t1>V0t1V11t1)]
 P[ε1t1<V0t1V11t1]V0t1
 
Etmax(V10t1ε2t1,V0t1)  P[ε2t1>V0t1V10t1][V10t1  E(ε2t1|ε2t1>V0t1V10t1)]
 P[ε2t1<V0t1V10t1]V0t1
Then, since (ε1t, ε2t) is bivariate normal, the conditional expectations above can be expressed as Mills
ratios, and the probabilities (conditioned on  ) can  be obtained from the standard normal xt+1
distribution function, : ()





























V0t1]dF(xt1, et1xt, et )
We construct   using the backward-induction algorithm described by Rust (1995).  EV e x y tttt (,,,) θ
Specifically, we assume that firms have a finite planning horizon of H years.   In the terminal year
there are no future periods to consider so   is set to zero in (A1.1), and each firm’s EV e x y HHHH (,,, ) θ
exporting decision maximizes current payoffs,  . Accordingly, for period H- u exz yy HH HHH (,, ,, , ) ,εθ −1
1, the expected value function is simply:
[] E V e x zy E ue x zy y
y
HHH H H H H H H H
H
−−− − − − = 111 1 1 1 (,, ,, ) m a x ( , , , , ,, ) θε θ
where expectations are taken over both  and  conditioned on  , as in (A1.4). Once the ε H xH xH−1
expected value function for period H-1 has been calculated for each possible realization on  , it xH−1
enters into the calculation of the expected value function for period H-2  can be calculated for each
possible realization on  : xH−2
{} []
E Vexz y
E u exz y y E Vexz y
y
HHH H
H H HH H H H H HH
H
−−− −





2 1 11 1 2 1 1 11
1
(,, ,, )
m a x ( , ,, , ,) ( , ,, ,)
θ
εθ δ θ
This calculation can be repeated, backing up one year at a time, until period  t.  This generates the
values needed for and  which in turn enter the likelihood function. V10t, V11t, V0t28 Breitung and Meyer (1994) make this observation in a similar context.
40
Appendix 2: Specification Tests for the Profit Function
1.   Trend Stationarity
To establish whether profits are trend stationary we first conduct an augmented Dickey-Fuller
test using the specification:
(A2.1) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) πφ φ π φ π φ ν it i it it it t =+ + ++ −− 01 1 2 1 3 ∆
Here, as in our structural model, the intercept is allowed to vary across 4 size classes. Given that
there are no unobserved plant effects or random coefficients, this specification does not suffer from
an incidental parameters problem and the distribution of the test statistic is straightforward to
obtain.
28 Specifically, if we let n (the number of plants) approach infinity while holding the number
of time periods and the number of size classes fixed, the parameters are asymptotically identified by
the cross-sectional variation in the data and the GMM estimator of standard errors is asymptotically
correct regardless of whether a unit root is present. The Dickey-Fuller test then amounts to a simple
t-test of whether . H010 :φ=
Results for the augmented Dickey-Fuller test are reported in Table A2.1. Note that we can
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, despite the relatively small coefficient on lagged profits. This
is because we use enough orthogonality conditions in our GMM estimator to obtain very precise
estimates. OLS estimates (not reported) are quite similar, but their standard errors are larger, and do
not permit us to reject the null of a unit root.29 The coefficient on the third lag was -0.059  with a standard error of 0.053. These results are not reported
in Table A2.2.
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2. Order of the  νit Process
To determine whether νit can be represented as the sum of two AR(1) processes (i.e., whether
m = 2 is a reasonable assumption), we multiply both sides of equation (1) by  , (1λ1L)(1λ2L)
yielding an ARMA(2,1) expression for log profits, conditioned on a distributed lag in the exchange
rate and a trend:
  . (A2.2) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
** * πββ π β π it i it it =+ + −− 01 1 2 2 ++ + + + + −− − ββ β β ψµ ψ 34 1 5 2 6 1
** * * ee e t tt t i ti t
Here  is serially uncorrelated and  s are functions of the various underlying ψ ωω it it it =+ 12 ,, β
*'
structural parameters. (Note in particular that  and  .)  This form of (11) can βλλ 11 2
* =+ βλλ 21 2
* =−
be implemented using GMM estimators if the non-linear parameter constraints are ignored; doing so
allows us to perform a battery of specification tests without cumbersome programming. In particular,
the presence of second order serial correlation in the disturbances or the significance of a third lag on
profits would challenge the assumption m = 2.
Estimates of equation A2.2  are reported in Table A2.2. Note first that our results are quite
consistent with the stationary ARMA(2,1) process implied by m = 2. Using Arellano and Bond’s
(1991) tests for serial correlation in the residuals, the null of no first-order correlation is rejected with
a p-value of 0.062, but the null of no second order correlation is easily accepted (p-value 0.782).
Further, although the second lag on log profits is quite significant, adding a third lag to the equation
does not significantly improve the fit.
29 As an aside, it is worth noting that the coefficients on lagged
profits imply roots of 0.972 and -0.452, which are close to the roots estimated by applying maximum
likelihood to equation 1. (See table 2 of the text.)Table A2.1
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Regression (GMM) 
Parameter Estimates
(Standard errors in parentheses)
(intercept 1) φ 01 0.188 
(0.098)
(intercept 2) φ 02 0.398 
(0.109)
(intercept 3) φ 03 0.292 
(0.102)
(intercept 4) 0.522  φ 04
(0.093)
 (lagged profits) -0.043  φ 1
(0.007)
(lagged change in profits) -0.298  φ 2
(0.016)
(trend) 0.034  φ 3
(0.002)
1
st order serial correlation test (z) 1.207
2
nd order serial correlation test (z) -0.087 Table  A2.2




(Asymptotic standard errors in
parentheses)
 (intercept 1) β 01
* -5.56 
(1.37)
 (intercept 2) β 02
* 0.27
 (0.15)
 (intercept 3) β 03
* 0.03 
(0.11)
 (intercept 4) 0.12  β 04
*
(0.15)
(log profits, t-1) 0.52  β 1
*
(0.04)
(log profits, t-2) 0.44  β 2
*
(0.04)
(log exchange rate) 0.63  β 3
*
(0.33)
(log exchange rate, t-1) 1.73  β 4
*
(0.36)
(log exchange rate, t-2) -1.10  β 5
*
(0.47)
(trend) -0.03  β 6
*
(0.02)
Mills ratio 0.23 
(0.09)
(imputed) .972 λ 1
 (imputed) -.452 λ 2
1
st order serial correlation test (z) 1.87
2
nd order serial correlation test (z) 0.28
aThe instrument set includes lagged values of export profits (two or more periods back), beginning of




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2plant rank - sorted by value
 probability of remaining in   probability of entering 
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 plant value  current profit
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Percentage Change in the Number of Exporters and Export Revenue

































 reduce fixed cost by 10  reduce fixed cost by 20
 reduce sunk cost by 50   10% revenue subsidy










Revenue-Cost Ratio for Alternative Export Subsidy PlansTable 1


















1982 6.18 41.71 25 1 1 79.5
1983  8.60 58.05 30 6 1 80.5
1984 7.90 55.32 28 1 3 89.8
1985 11.79 79.58 25 3 6 102.2
1986 14.10 95.17 24 1 2 113.6
1987 15.40 103.95 23 1 2 113.7
1988 21.97 148.30 28 6 1 112.3
1989 20.62 139.19 27 2 3 115.2
1990 27.10 182.93 28 1 0 127.2
1991 35.00 236.25 30 2 0 121.1
Average 16.866 114.045 26.8 2.4 1.9 105.51
*  Data describe the 62 Colombian producers of industrial chemicals continually observed over the period 1982-91.
a  Billions of 1986 pesos (deflation done using manufacturing-wide wholesale price deflator).
b  Millions of 1999 dollars (conversion done at the official 1986 exchange rate and brought forward using the U.S. wholesale
price deflator).Table 2
 Operating Profit Function Parameters ( and Ωx )  Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ
Coefficient Standard Error
ψ1 (intercept) -3.034 (4.901)
ψ2 (size dummy 2)  -2.344 (0.852)
ψ3 (size dummy 3) -0.899 (0.912)
ψ4 (size dummy 4) -1.819 (1.124)
ψ5 (log exchange rate) 2.453 (1.104)
ψ6 (trend) 0.005 (0.063)
Mills ratio 2.375 (0.591)
λ1 (root, x1) -0.502 (0.145)
λ2 (root, x2) 0.895 (0.051)
q1 (variance, ω1 ) 0.366 (0.120)
q2  (variance, ω2 ) 0.763 (0.036)
sample size 293 observations
log-likelihood -351.714Table 3
Sunk and Fixed Cost Estimates 






242.17 108.53 309.46 Γ S1
135.52 67.04 161.42 Γ S2
155.60 70.77 184.58 Γ S3
107.99 54.41 136.57 ΓS4
0.476 3.50 4.39 Γ F
58.03 32.54 64.37 1
59.62 34.67 72.43 2
log-likelihood -129.67
    
(grid size = 100, number of simulated trajectories per plant =10)